| | | | Eastern Europe: A Wellspring of Liberalism? | | Once a hotbed of populist nationalism, Central and Eastern Europe are now a source of hope for liberal democracy, Jeffrey A. Stacey writes in a New York Times op-ed. Citing Slovakia's election of a reformist president, liberal victories in local Polish elections, massive protests against the Czech Republic's prime minister, Austria's far-right scandal, and anti-Russian protests in Georgia, Stacey writes that in "a seemingly unlikely region, a rear-guard action has quietly begun to challenge the 'populist surge.'"
As Roger Cohen wrote in a New York Times column, Greece has taken its own turn away from populism. Along with the underperformance of far-right parties in the recent EU elections, these Eastern developments show that the "vaunted liberal international order, however damaged, remains intact to a significant degree," in Stacey's view. | | By enriching more uranium and escalating tensions at sea, Iran is purposefully raising the specter of war, Frida Ghitis writes in a column for the World Politics Review.
Analysts have offered various theories on Iranian strategy, but Ghitis suggests Iran "is telling the world, and the American people more than anyone" that unless the US lowers tensions, it could face "a reprisal of the war in Iraq." Tehran is "trying to engage in just enough provocations to keep the fear of war alive without going so far as to spark a devastating military response," she writes—a "tightrope" Iran will walk until the 2020 US election. The strategy is working, she argues, as President Trump appears to have backed off, given the risk of sparking an undesirable war.
Of course, not everyone agrees. MIT's Jim Walsh, writing for CNN, sees a reckless president fantastically believing a war will be easy to win, whose defining foreign-policy legacy will be a nuclear-armed Iran. | | Why Putin Wins: Three Theories | | Is Russian President Vladimir Putin a grandmaster of geopolitical chess, or is his prowess overblown? In an American Interest essay, Carla Anne Robbins seeks to explain why Putin appears to consistently outmaneuver the West—including in Ukraine, Syria, and the 2016 US election—despite Russia having an economy less than one tenth the size of Europe's and a defense budget less than one tenth the size of America's.
She offers three theories. One is that Putin was the first to realize the Internet and social media could be used to destabilize democratic societies, advance his goals, and complement his regional military campaigns. Another is that US presidents, from George W. Bush (under whose watch Putin invaded Georgia) to Barack Obama (who demurred at Putin's aggression) to Donald Trump (who fawns over his Russian counterpart) have enabled Putin's outsized world influence. Another is that "there really is something about Putin"—that he's a successful risk-taker who picks his spots well. Regardless, Putin has his insecurities, Robbins argues, suggesting the West could do well to find and exploit them. | | Saudi Arabia, UAE in a Political Box | | If President Trump loses reelection in 2020, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may find themselves without a friend in Washington, Alia Awadallah writes at Foreign Policy, as the two Gulf countries have alienated Democrats by supporting President Trump overtly after criticizing president Obama for years.
"Instead of seeking to build strong relationships and respect across party lines, they behaved as if the Trump-era blank check for their behavior would never end," Awadallah writes. "The question now is whether the Gulf countries will be able to undo the damage to their reputations among Democrats." With Congress seeking to reset America's stance toward Saudi Arabia, efforts to change the trajectory could be difficult, Awadallah argues. | | | | | | |
No comments:
Post a Comment