| | What the UK Ambassador Scandal Says About Britain | | While the resignation of Britain's ambassador to the US, over leaked criticisms of the Trump administration, may have a chilling effect on diplomats' abilities to speak freely, it may also reveal something about Britain. The dispute proves Britain's alliance with the US has changed, Ben Judah writes for The Atlantic—that while the "special relationship" held firm in an older Washington, recent administrations have been more concerned with what Britain can do for America now. "Trump's Washington is no city of nostalgics, or romantics," and as Britain's global standing has waned, so has its influence in DC. The episode, and in particular Boris Johnson's refusal to stand by ambassador Kim Darroch, further reveals divisions in British politics, Robert Shrimsley writes in the Financial Times. Brexiteers opposed Darroch, and the saga "has split politics down Leave and Remain lines," he writes. | | That's what The Washington Post's David Ignatius suggests Democrats should pursue, rather than a simple return to the 2015 nuclear accord. President Trump's opponents can take a political "high ground" by criticizing him while also adopting a hard line on Iran's regional activities—and proposing a broader diplomatic accord to curtail them. Other analysts have hinted this might be difficult, pointing out that even going back to the 2015 agreement—much less attaining more concessions—could be tough, and there are those who see the initial deal as just fine. Writing at LobeLog, for instance, Gary Sick suggests the 2015 deal included "precisely the kind of denuclearization commitment that the Trump administration would like to get from North Korea." | | What's Different About Israel's Next Elections | | After Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's failure to form a government, Israel's looming fall elections aren't just a rerun, Thomas Friedman writes in The New York Times: They "could tear apart every synagogue and Jewish institution on college campuses, in America and across the diaspora." "In April's election, there was tacit collusion between the right and the center-left in Israel not to discuss the Palestinian issue," Friedman writes—but in the fall campaign, that divisive issue will come to the fore. That's because former prime minister Ehud Barak has entered the race and is campaigning on it: Barak has "been hammering Netanyahu on Twitter," attacking proposals for annexation and "the far right's effort to take over Palestinian territories while ensuring the Palestinians there would never have the same political rights as Israelis," Friedman writes. As for the election's outcome, Dahlia Scheindlin writes for Foreign Affairs that it'll depend on the right—Barak's entry, and other developments, "will mean little if voters just shift within the left and center"—and that odds are against a major change in results. | | Repeating the Mistakes of Iraq | | Taking issue with the US Army's long and thorough exegesis of the Iraq War, Jon Finer writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs that the US is learning the wrong lessons. A few pernicious trends are converging, and they pose an acute risk today, he suggests: notably, the notion that Iran was the true "winner" of the US war, gaining influence in Iraq in the end, and the conclusion that President Obama's withdrawal was as grave a mistake as President Bush's invasion. If the US follows that analysis, Finer suggests, it risks concluding that Iraq proves more aggression, not less, is the answer—specifically, aggression against Iran. That's a dangerous lesson to draw, right now, as an inexperienced and impressionable president squares off with Tehran, Finer writes. | | China Eyes Military Dominance | | As President Xi Jinping aims to modernize China's military into "world-class forces" by 2050, Derek Grossman of the RAND Corporation recently warned that means being able to defeat the US in a regional war. China is pursuing advancements "in aerospace, cyberspace, unmanned systems, and underwater warfare," plus "robotics, autonomous weapons, nanotechnology, 3-D printing, big data analytics, advanced manufacturing, AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, human-machine cooperation, cloud computing, and hypersonics," Grossman posits. China achieving its goal would "represent perhaps the most destabilizing geostrategic development of the 21st century," Grossman suggests. China may also be tempted to try out its new capabilities in a limited war that doesn't involve the US, Grossman writes, indicating Vietnam could be a possible target, with territorial disputes as a starting point for conflict. | | | | | |
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